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The present paper deals with the semantics of all, some and not in English
and related languages. Since these semantics imply a logic, it also deals
with the logic of quantification in natural language. To the extent that the
linguistic findings are universally valid, the results are relevant to the study
of human cognition in general.
Since standard quantification theory (SQT) replaced Aristotelian Predicate
Calculus (APC), philosophers of language and semanticists have struggled
with the fact that APC corresponds better with natural semantic intuitions
than SQT. Pragmatics was called in to restore APC on non-logical, prag-
matic grounds. The replacement of APC by SQT was motivated on the
grounds that (a) APC suffers from improper existential import, and (b)
SQT is a straightforward application of Boolean algebra, and as such
preserves syllogistic reasoning on a mathematical basis.
Logically speaking, SQT differs from APC in that the Aristotelian
subaltern entailments are abolished, which makes the Aristotelian Square
collapse but saves the equivalences (conversions) between ¬∀¬ and ∃, and
¬∃¬ and ∀. In SQT, the quantifying predicate ∃ over pairs of sets <X, Y>
yields truth iff X ∩ Y ≠ Ø and ∀ does so iff X ⊆ Y. The author recently
found that if the condition X ≠ Ø is added to the condition for ∀ and the
conversions are changed into one-way entailments (i.e. ∀x(Fx,Gx) |  –
¬∃x(Fx,¬Gx) and ∀x(Fx,¬Gx) |  – ¬∃x(Fx,Gx), but not vice versa), APC is
restored without improper existential import (only the subcontraries are
lost). The Boolean basis is unaffected since whenever ∀ yields truth, it is
still so that X ⊆ Y. The resulting revised Aristotelian predicate calculus
(RAPC), is represented in the Hexagon of fig. 1 (arrows stand for entail-
ments, ‘C’ for contraries, ‘CD’ for contradictories). Note that the tradi-
tional (Boethian) letter types A,.I, E and O have been replaced with ∀, ∃,
∀¬ and ∃¬, respectively, since APC contains only the standard quantifiers
∀ and ∃, plus the standard negation ¬. (This answers the question, raised
by Horn (1972, 1989:252-67) and Levinson (2000:69-71), of why the O-
corner in APC is never lexicalised: there ís no O-corner to be lexicalized!)
The revision of APC is easily shown by means of a valuation space
interpretation (VSI) (Van Fraassen 1971). Let the valuation space (VS) of
a sentence A, /A/, be the set of situations in a universe U of possible situ-
ations in which A is true. To say that A is true now amounts to saying that
the actual situation sa ∈ /A/. Clearly, /¬A/ = U – /A/, /A ∧ B/ = /A/ ∩ /B/, and
/A ∨ B/ = /A/ ∪ /B/, and the whole of standard propositional calculus can be
derived. APC can be rendered in VSI terms as in fig. 2, where each ring
(circle) is marked for the VS of each Aristotelian sentence type. Given the
fact that, as indicated in fig. 2, relations of entailment, contrariety, subcon-
2trariety and contradiction can be read from the VSI diagram, the whole of
APC is represented in fig. 2.











            Figure 2         
U
X entails Y iff /X/ is a subset of /Y/
X & Y are contraries iff the 
intersection of /X/ & /Y/ is empty
X & Y are subcontraries iff the 
union of /X/ & /Y/ equals U
X & Y are contradictories iff /X/ 







APC, however, fails to take into account the set of situations where the F-
class is empty. Therefore, U in fig. 2 is incomplete and must be extended
with a further ring containing those situations in which there is no repre-
sentative of the F-predicate, as shown in fig. 3a.


















Now, however, the logical relations have changed. The subcontraries have
gone and the conversions have been changed into one-way entailments as
shown in the Hexagon of fig. 1. One notes that in fig. 3a, which represents
RAPC, ∀, ∃, ∀¬ and ∃¬ are all false in cases where there is no F. SQT, on
the contrary, declares both ∀ and ∀¬ true in such cases, as shown in fig.
3b. This, in fact, is the only difference between RAPC and SQT.
From the point of view of natural intuitions, the loss of the subcontraries
does not appear serious, as it is easy to see the simultaneous falsity of
“Some F is G” and “Some F is not-G” for cases where the F-class is non-
instantiated. The replacement of the equivalences by one-way entailments
from the universal quantifier ∀ likewise looks empirically promising. The
inference from “All students did not pass the exam” to “No student
passed the exam” seems correct, whereas the inference from “No proof of
the man’s guilt has been found” to “All proofs of the man’s guilt have not
been found” does not. Similarly, “All students passed” seems to license
3“No student did not pass”, but not vice versa, since many speakers will
judge the former false but the latter true in cases where there were no stud-
ents. If these judgements are correct, the Hexagon, i.e. RAPC, corresponds
even better to natural intuitions than the original APC.
Like SQT, however, RAPC still fails to account for intensional (i.e.
imagined) entities and intensional predicates (i.e. predicates that do not
require real existence of the argument term referent for truth). For example,
a sentence like “Some gods are worshipped in that temple” may well be
true without it being necessary to conclude that there exist real gods. For
that reason, the quantificational calculus must be modified and generalised
to account for intensional phenomena as well.
Since natural language refers to and quantifies over intensional objects in
precisely the same way as it does with regard to extensional (really exist-
ing) objects, there appears to be a prima facie requirement that single the-
ories of reference and of quantification should account for both the ex-
tensional and the intensional cases. This makes it mandatory to accept an
ontology containing incompletely defined intensional objects, as proposed
by the Austrian philosopher Alexius Meinong (1853-1920). In an inten-
sional theory of quantification, the universe of individuals I must contain
all really existing as well as all imagined entities (objects). The quantifiers
are still higher order predicates over pairs of sets (generalized quantifiers).
However, the restrictor set (R-set) is no longer the standard extension of
the predicate Fx, [[Fx]], comprising the set of entities that satisfy Fx, but
the intensional extension {Fx} or the set of entities that satisfy Fx plus
those that satisfy Π(Fx) (where Π is an intensional predicate/operator).
One notes that {Fx} cannot be empty, since whenever Fx is mentioned it
has automatically been imagined. This makes it possible to remove the
condition X ≠ Ø from the satisfaction conditions of ∀.
At this point the minimal, presupposition-preserving negation “~” must
be defined. We take it that the satisfaction conditions of a predicate P are
divided into two subsets, the preconditions and the update conditions (cp.
Seuren at al. 2001). The former define the presuppositions of the proposi-
tion Pa, i.e. the conditions of contextual coherence (‘discourse anchoring’)
for Pa; the latter define the semantic contribution made by Pa to the dis-
course at hand. Together they form the truth conditions of Pa. Since an
unanchored sentence lacks a truth value and does not express a proposi-
tion (as when I say to you now “The man was right after all”, without any
explanation as to the identity of the man or the issue at hand), the
preconditions are truth-conditional, not just pragmatic, as is widely held in
pragmatic circles. For good functional reasons of coherent discourse, the
normal default negation in natural language toggles between satisfaction
and non-satisfaction of the update conditions, leaving the preconditions
unaffected. This negation is called the minimal negation, represented by
“~”. In VSI terms, we say that for each sentence A there is a subuniverse
of possible situations UA, where the presuppositions of A are true (cp.
4Seuren et al. 2001). If A has no presuppositions (i.e. the predicate of A has
no preconditions), UA = U. We now say that for all sentences A, /A/ ⊆ UA
and /~A/ ⊆ UA, and /~A/ = UA – /A/. There is also a radical negation ~ ,
such that /~A/ = U – UA. This, however, is left out of consideration here.
But note that /~A/ ∪ /~A/ = /¬A/, as shown in fig. 4.








We now define [<Fx>], the presuppositional extension of the predicate Fx,
as the set of entities that satisfy the preconditions of Fx, i.e. for which
either Fx or ~Fx yields truth. Clearly, if Fx has no preconditions, [<Fx>] =
I and {Fx} = [[Fx]]. We define the universal quantifier ∀ as taking the pre-
condition that  {Fx} ∩ [<Gx>] ≠ Ø, and the update condition that  {Fx} ∩
[<Gx>] ⊆ [[Gx]]. In other words, “All F is G” is true iff for all e ∈ {Fx} ∩
[<Gx>] (i.e. e ∈ {Fx}qualifies for the predicate Gx), e ∈ [[Gx]]. For exam-
ple, “All Englishmen are rich” is true iff all members of {Englishman(x)}
that qualify for the predicate “rich” are indeed rich. Since “rich” has a pre-
condition of existence for its subject term, the class of imaginary English-
men is automatically excluded from consideration. On the other hand, “All
unicorns are imaginary” is true in this world, since the predicate “ima-
ginary” has no existential precondition, so that [<imaginary(x)>] = I. Since
{unicorn(x)} ∩ I = {unicorn(x)}, it is sufficient that {unicorn(x)} ⊆
[[imaginary(x)]], which is the case. Existential import is thus taken away
from the existential quantifier and placed in the G-predicate. “Some Eng-
lishmen are rich” now entails the existence of Englishmen, but “Some gods
are worshipped” does not entail the existence of gods, since “rich” is ex-
tensional but “be worshipped” intensional with regard to the subject term.
Whether the precondition {Fx} ∩ [<Gx>] ≠ Ø specified for ∀ should also
be specified for (the negation of) ∃, depends on natural intuitions. If a sen-
tence like “No unicorn likes hay” is deemed true in this world, which is far
from unlikely, then the answer is No, otherwise Yes. Pending the availabi-
lity of reliable data, we leave both options open. In fact, French speakers
report that “Aucun unicorne n’aime le foin” is more likely to be taken to
be false, whereas “Il n’y a pas d’unicorne qui aime le foin” is clearly true.
There may thus be different varieties of the (negated) existential quantifier.
This account restores the equivalence of “not-all F is G” and “some F is
not G”, which was lost in RAPC. In RAPC, ¬∀(Fx,Gx) ≡/  ∃(Fx,¬Gx), since
when [[Fx]] = Ø, ¬∀(Fx,Gx) is true while ∃(Fx,¬Gx) is false. In the inten-
sional calculus, however, when the matrix predicate Gx is extensional,
~∀(Fx,Gx) is false in cases where [[Fx]] = Ø, owing to existential presup-
position failure, while ∃(Fx,~Gx) is likewise false. When, on the other
5hand, Gx is intensional, it is immaterial whether or not [[Fx]] = Ø, since
with intensional matrix predicates the conditions for both ∀ and ∃ apply
to {Fx}, which is automatically nonempty (see above). Fig. 5 shows this
more clearly: the shaded area represents /~∀(Fx,Gx)/, which coincides with
/∃(Fx,~Gx)/. If the G-predicate has no preconditions, U∀ = U, which leaves
the equivalence intact. This again improves the empirical status of the
calculus.







{Fx}    [<Gx>]  = Ø∩
U∀
On the other hand, however, there is a problem (signalled by a number of
authors, e.g. Zalta 1988, Castañeda in Haller 1985/6:58, Lejewski in Haller
1985/6:232), with the truth conditions of simple sentences of the form
“Holmes is an Englishman”. We want to say that “Some Englishmen are
imaginary” is true, since {Englishman(x)} ∩ [[imaginary(x)]] ≠ Ø. If we are
then asked to mention an instance of an imaginary Englishman, we want to
be able to produce, for example, Sherlock Holmes as imagined by Conan
Doyle. Yet under the terms specified so far “Holmes is an Englishman” is
(radically) false owing to presupposition failure, since to be an Englishman
one first has to exist, which Holmes does not do. We need, therefore, a
second interpretation under which “Holmes is an Englishman” is true,
which makes this sentence ambiguous. Our solution consists, in principle,
in adding the hedge “who/which qualifies for the (main) predicate Gx” not
only to all quantified terms but also to instantiations adduced in a chain of
argument. Not only would “Some Englishmen are  imaginary” then be read
as “Some Englishmen who qualify for the predicate “imaginary” are
imaginary”, but “Holmes is an Englishman” would then likewise be read as
“Holmes is an Englishman who qualifies for the predicate “imaginary”, or
“Holmes is a case in point”. However, the mechanism for the distribution
of such hedges has not been developed yet (see Castañeda in Haller
1985/6:58 for a similar view, but without formal elaboration).
One possible implication for the study of human cognition should be men-
tioned here. It appears that human cognition does not naturally develop
the concept of null set until a very high degree of mathematical abstraction
is achieved. The question is whether a satisfactory logic and semantics of
quantification can be developed without the help of Ø to account for the
lower levels of abstraction where natural language operates. As has been
shown above, intensional predicate calculus eliminates Ø as an option for
the R-set (F-predicate). It remains to eliminate Ø for the matrix set (G-
6predicate): a sentence like “Some logicians are 450 years old”, where the
predicate “450 years old” is uninstantiated, must be processable and result
in the value False. This may be achieved by treating the quantifiers as
binary predicates over pairs of R-sets and predicate intensions (satisfac-
tion conditions of predicates). “All F is G” now means: “all members of
{Fx} that qualify for Gx satisfy the conditions of Gx”. One notes that this
would be a return to the Aristotelian notion of a proposition as the mental
assignment of a property to an entity or set of entities. It would also place
the medieval theory of distributive supposition in a new formal light.
There is, furthermore, the peculiar fact that, at a non-reflective default
level of cognitive operation, some is naturally interpreted as “partial”, and
thus equivalent with “partial not”. The corresponding extensional calculus
is shown in fig. 6 (with “P” for ‘partial’ ‘and “=“ for ‘equivalent’):













It may be assumed that at this default level of abstraction the notion
‘subset’ (denoted by “some F”) is defaultwise interpreted as ‘proper
subset’. The combination of the ‘no-null-set’ hypothesis with the ‘proper
subset’ hypothesis opens an interesting perspective on further research
into the logical properties of cognition.
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